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McC.: Constitutional Law--Equal Protection of the Law--State Regulation

CASE COMMENTS
a conviction, the efficient administration of criminal justice would
be seriously impaired. For example, there is no duty upon a
prosecutor to present a question to the court which an intelligent
and well represented defendant does not see fit to raise in his own
behalf. United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
The evil which the courts should and apparently do attempt to
meet is not partisanship per se but deceit and dishonesty. See
Comment, 62 HAIv. L. REv. 1284 (1949).
There can be no doubt that suppression by the prosecutor of
evidence that is favorable to the defendant is a deceitful and dishonest practice, and while the courts look upon such conduct with
disfavor and while the Canons of Professional Ethics, supra, condemn the practice, no case is found in which a prosecuting attorney
has been removed from office or otherwise disciplined on such
ground. See 27 C.J.S., District and Prosecuting Attorneys § 7
(1941).
In West Virginia a prosecutor may be removed from office for
"official misconduct, incompetence, neglect of duty, or gross immorality." W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 6. W. VA. CODE c. 6, art. 6,
§ 7 (Michie 1955), provides the procedure for such removal. Al.
though there are no cases so holding, it would seem that in West
Virginia, on the basis of the decisions cited herein, if a prosecutor
withheld evidence favorable to the defendant, his action would
amount to a neglect of his primary duty, e.g., to see that justice
is done. There is a strong basis for the belief that his neglect
would, in turn, be ground for removal from office.
T. E. P.
CoNsTrrUTONAL LA--EQUAL PFOTECMON OF THE LAWs-STATE
EREGuLAnON OF MoNEY ORDER AGENCIE.-The Illinois Community

Currency Exchange Act, having as its purpose the protection of the
public, required all firms selling or issuing money orders within
the state to secure a license and to submit to specified restrictive
regulations. The American Express Company, being of unquestionable solvency, was specifically exempted under the act. P, a
competing money order agency, contended that the exemption constituted a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Held, affirming the district court, that the relationship
of the statutory classification to the purpose of the act was too
remote, and in effect created a closed class favoring a named cor-
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pany, with accompanying economic advantages to that company,
thus depriving P of equal protection of the laws. Morey v. Doud,
77 Sup. Ct 1344 (1957) (6-3 decision).
At the time of its adoption, the primary purpose of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was to protect the
Negro in the enjoyment of his newly acquired rights. Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873). However, the clause has served as authority
for the general proposition that a citizen or corporation of a state
is entitled to the equal protection of equal laws. Santa ClaraCounty
v. Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 856 (1886).
This guarantee of equal laws has been raised in numerous cases
to question the basis or purpose of legislative classifications, discretionary in nature. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 958 (1956)
(indigency); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (color);
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (sex); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (race). The difficulty lies in
attempting to create and apply uniform rules for implementing
this abstract constitutional command. Cf. Kotch v. River Port
Pilot Cormners, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
As early as 1885, the Court concluded that the fourteenth
amendment was not designed to interfere with the police power
of the state to prescribe regulations to promote health, peace,
morals, education and the general good order of the people.
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885). In admitting that all
legislation cannot apply equally to all persons, the Court recognized
that a great deal of legislation will be of a special nature, applicable only to limited classified groups, and that the effect of this
legislation must be to impose special burdens or inequalities upon,
or grant special benefits to, certain groups or classes of individuals.
Thus there exists a basic contradiction between the constitutional
pledge of equal protection of the laws and the legislative right to
classify, since the very idea of classification is inequality. Tussman
and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALw. L. BEV.
341, 34-44 (1949).
In the principal case, the legislature saw fit to place all money
order agencies in a special classified group imposing certain restrictions upon them, while exempting one named company, the purpose of the classification being the protection of the public from
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insolvent companies. Admittedly, such a classification works an
inequality resulting in economic discrimination to the regulated
companies, but such a result is not necessarily a violation of the
equal protection clause. Cf. InternationalHarvesterCo. v. Missouri,
234 U.S. 199 (1914); Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26 (1912). The
classification is a violation only if it fails to satisfy the reasonable
classification test, which poses the question, "Is the classification,
in relation to the purpose of the statute, so completely without
reason and therefore purely arbitrary, as to constitute an invidious
discrimination?" Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955); Lindsley v. Natural CarbonicGas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1910).
The general rule, particularly in the field of economic classification and regulation, is that a state has wide discretion in its power
to classify. Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114 (1900). The Court
has continually refused to question legislative motives and legislative handling of local problems so long as there is some slight relationship between the classification and the object of the legislation.
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1948); New
York Rapid Transit Co. v. New York, 303 U.S. 57a (1938); Bayside
Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1935).
Although the majority of the Court in the principal case found
the Illinois statute to be unreasonable and invidiously discriminatory, there are a wealth of decisions, in the field of economic regulation, which would seem to support the dissenting opinions of
Justices Black and Frankfurter.
In Barrett v. Indiana,229 U.S. 26 (1912), the Court upheld a
state statute singling out bituminous coal mines and omitting block
coal mines when requiring mine entries to be of not less than prescribed width. Mr. Justice Day pointed out that although the
equal protection clause requires laws of like application to all
similarly situated, still if in the judgment of the legislature a distinction is to be made, then the classification must stand, unless
the Court can say that there is absolutely no fair reason for its
existence.
An Oklahoma statute making it unlawful for opticians not
licensed as optometrists to fit lenses in frames, while specifically
exempting sellers of ready-to-wear glasses, has been held valid.
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The Court
here recognized that it cannot possibly have the understanding of
purely local problems which a state legislature will have. Since the
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legislature must have felt that the two branches of the optical business presented distinct regulatory problems, the presumption is that
the basis for the classification is reasonable. Cf. Goesaert v. Cleary,
supra.
A Texas statute, having as its purpose the promotion of free
enterprise, forbade various forms of combinations and monopolies,
but expressly exempted corresponding agricultural activities. Holding the statute valid, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a near
unanimous Court, expressed the policy which the Court has most
consistently followed during the past two decades:
"The equality at which the Equal Protection Clause aims is not
a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins
the equal
lawstoand
laws units,
are not
propositions.protection
They doofnottherelate
abstract
but abstract
are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties, addressed
to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in la as though they
were the same. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1939).
(Emphasis added.)
In the opinion of the Illinois legislature, the American Express
Company did not possess the dangerous characteristics at which
the statute was aimed. Should such material characteristics as
solvency, size, dependability and general scope of operations be
considered, it might be contended that the exempted company was
so different from the regulated companies as to constitute in fact a
dissimilar institution. If the question of equal protection is to be
decided on practical considerations based on experience rather than
by theoretical inconsistencies, the classification conceived by the
Illinois legislature would not appear to be completely without
reason. Railway Express Agency v. New York, supra; cf. Goesaertv.
Cleary, supra.
Had the legislature applied an indirect approach in exempting
the American Express Company, such as a classification based on
size or corporate net worth, it is conceivable that the statute would
have withstood the reasonable classification test. Cf. Miller v.
Strahl, 239 U.S. 426 (1915); Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128 (1911).
The decision in the principal case would bear out the assumption that a statute directly exempting by name a given corporation
from a particular classification will be closely examined by the
Court for a possible violation of the equal protection clause.
D. L. McC.
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